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Abstract
This study evaluates the contents of representations of skin cancer risk and their
associations with risk appraisals, worry, and protection intentions and behaviors. The
Assessment of Illness Risk Representations (AIRR) was used to measure conceptual and
imagery contents of risk representations, as delineated by the Common-Sense Model.
University students (N¼120) completed the AIRR; measures of likelihood and severity
appraisals, and worry; and measures of skin self-examination, clinical skin examination,
and sun protection intentions and behaviors. Beliefs about identity, causal, and timeline
risk were positively associated with likelihood appraisals, whereas consequences
and timeline risk beliefs were positively associated with severity appraisals. Identity and
timeline risk independently predicted worry. Representational attributes, including
imagery vividness and valence, independently predicted intentions and behaviors,
whereas likelihood and severity appraisals did not. Symptom imagery interacted with
worry to predict detection and prevention intentions: worry predicted greater intentions
for participants with symptom imagery but not for those without symptom imagery.
The findings support the utility of the AIRR for assessing risk representations and identify
ways in which risk representations may guide protective behavior.
Keywords: Risk perception, illness representations, health behavior, cancer, skin cancer
Introduction
Risk perceptions are identified by many theories as primary motivators of health
behaviors (Brewer, Weinstein, Cuite, & Herrington, 2004; Floyd, Prentice-Dunn,
& Rogers, 2000) and there is increasing recognition that worry and other
risk-related affect also influence protective intentions and actions (Loewenstein,
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Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; McCaul, Schroeder, & Reid, 1996). Yet it remains
to be determined what information serves as the basis for these risk appraisals and
affect. Likelihood and severity estimates are probably made ‘‘on the spot’’ rather
than retrieved from memory (Windschitl, 2002), and so they will be shaped by
accessible beliefs and memories. In order to change risk perceptions and worry
in ways that motivate protective behavior, it is important to identify the mental
contents underlying these risk appraisals and affect as well as the various ways
in which these contents may influence motivations to engage in protective
behavior. This study evaluates the relationships of representations of skin cancer
risk with risk appraisals, worry, and protection intentions and actions. The study
focuses on skin cancer because it is a familiar threat to young adults in
New Zealand, where skin cancer incidence rates are among the highest in
the world (Stewart & Kleihues, 2003). Moreover, protection involves regular use
of both prevention and detection behaviors and so there is the opportunity
to evaluate the roles of risk representations for both types of protective action.
Evidence suggests that cognitions and affect may differentially influence
prevention and detection motivations (Cameron, 2003a).
The Common-Sense Model (CSM) provides a framework for identifying
the contents of health threat representations, and for understanding how these
cognitions and associated emotions motivate protective behavior (Leventhal,
Brisette, & Leventhal, 2003). According to the CSM, representations include five
attributes: identity (the illness label and symptoms), cause (factors responsible for
its occurrence), timeline (time of onset and course of the illness), consequences
(expected pain, psychosocial effects, and death) and control/cure (personal and
medical control over illness progression). These representations elicit emotional
arousal such as worry, and both representations, and emotions guide decisions
to engage in protective behavior. The CSM delineates abstract–conceptual
processes and concrete–experiential processes in cognitive and emotional systems
(Epstein et al., 2004; Paivio, Walsh, & Bons, 1994; Kreuter et al., 1999; Stacy,
Ames, & Knowlton, 2004a), with representations including both abstract beliefs
and concrete images. Despite recognition of the potential role of imagery
processes in health behavior (Stacy et al., 2004a; Stacy, Pearce, Zogg, Unger, &
Dent, 2004b), there has been little systematic exploration of these processes
to date.
Representations of illness risk
Although research with illness groups has yielded considerable information
regarding illness representations and their associations with affect and behavior
(Hagger & Orbell, 2003), there has been little effort to explore representations
of illness risk held by healthy people (for exceptions see Figueiras & Alves, 2007;
Kelly et al., 2005; Marteau & Weinman, 2006). It is proposed that illness risk
representations are distinct from illness representations in that they develop from
the process of matching characteristics of the self with illness representation
attributes (Cameron, 2003b). For example, one’s representation of causal factors
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relating to skin cancer risk (‘‘my history of sunburns puts me at risk of skin
cancer’’) is based on matching self-characteristics (‘‘I’ve had a lot of sunburns’’)
with beliefs about the causes of skin cancer (‘‘sunburns cause skin cancer’’).
When aspects of self-representations do not match with corresponding elements
of illness representations, then risk beliefs will be low (‘‘I’ve had a lot of sunburns,
but sunburns don’t cause skin cancer and so I’m not at risk’’).
It is proposed that the five attributes of illness risk representations link directly
with risk-related appraisals and worry (Cameron, 2003b). The attributes of
identity, cause, and timeline are expected to serve as the basis for the generation of
likelihood estimates. Within the context of skin cancer, identity may include
conceptual beliefs that one’s features (e.g., pale skin) puts one at risk as well as
images of risk symptoms, such as large moles on one’s back. Causal risk beliefs,
which relate to personal experiences that place one at risk, may include beliefs such
as‘‘skin cancerrunsinmyfamily’’aswellasmemoriesandimages,suchasthoseof
one’s father dying of melanoma. Timeline beliefs that are of potential importance
for risk responses concern the potential time of illness onset; these contents may
includeconceptualbeliefs,suchas‘‘I’mtooyoungtogetskincancer’’andconcrete
contents, such as images of old people with skin cancer lesions. The remaining two
representational attributes, consequences and controllability, are expected to serve
as the basis for severity estimates. Contents relating to physical and disability
consequences of an illness should promote greater severity appraisals, whereas
beliefs that the illness could be controlled through treatment should reduce
perceived severity. Control over prevention may be an additional, unique attribute
ofillness riskrepresentations. Beliefs thatonecantakeactions topreventtheillness
may reduce likelihood estimates and worry. These beliefs overlap with the
theoretical concepts of self-efficacy and response efficacy, coping resources beliefs
whichoftenpredictprotectionmotivation(Floydetal.,2000).Giventheirrichness
and structure, illness risk representations may influence protection intentions and
behavior in ways that are independent of their influences on likelihood and severity
appraisals or worry.
Imagery contents of representations
Information represented as images may have stronger influences on behavior
relative to information represented at an abstract level (Metcalfe & Mischel,
1999; Paivio et al., 1994; Stacy et al., 2004a). Mental images are linked with
coping skills and knowledge, such as the scripts for taking action, and so they may
be particularly potent cues to protective action (Leventhal et al., 2003; Stacy
et al., 2004a). For example, vivid images of sunscreen bottles and hats evoked
when thinking about skin cancer may prompt intentions to use sunscreen
and wear protective clothing when going outside. Moreover, positive imagery
may trigger approach motivation processes, orienting attention to the gains
in adopting a behavior. Research suggests that approach motivations are
particularly effective in promoting prevention behaviors (Rothman, Kelly,
Hertel, & Salovey, 2003).
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Symptom imagery is likely to be a common type of imagery associated with
illness risk, as symptoms are primary identity features of illness (Leventhal et al.,
2003). Moreover, just as symptom experiences are primary motivators of
protective behavior (Cameron, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 1993; Leventhal et al.,
2003), symptom imagery may be a powerful trigger for protective actions.
For illness risk behavior, the elicitation of symptom imagery may serve as a
catalyst for decision-making processes for taking protective action. As concrete
signs of danger, symptom images may activate the controlled consideration
of the need to protect oneself, given one’s risk-related beliefs and worry.
Concrete–experiential and emotional systems are closely linked (Epstein, 1994),
and so symptom imagery may be particularly likely to trigger the affective
processes through which worry promotes motivations for protective behavior.
In effect, symptom imagery may moderate the influence of worry on decisions
to engage in protective action. The activation of symptom imagery may trigger
the affective processes of decision-making, with higher worry leading to greater
intentions and actions. In the absence of symptom imagery, worry may not
be sufficient to motivate action. Associations between worry and protection
motivations are variable, ranging from moderate to weak or nonsignificant (e.g.,
McCaul et al., 1996), suggesting that other risk-related cues may influence the
impact of worry with protective intentions and actions. Symptom imagery may be
one such cue, in which the combination of worry with symptom imagery may be
needed to induce decisions to engage in protective actions.
Study aims
This study explores the contents of skin cancer risk representations using a new
measure, the Assessment of Illness Risk Representations (AIRR). The AIRR is
based on a measure of illness representations (the Illness Perceptions
Questionnaire-Revised or IPQ-R; Moss-Morris et al., 2002), but it is adapted
to address unique aspects of risk representations as well as imagery contents.
This measure applies principles underlying free-association and top-of-mind
awareness techniques designed to elicit contents with the strongest associations
with a construct (Nelson, McEvoy, & Dennis, 2000; Stacy et al., 2004b). The
study also assesses the relationships of risk representational attributes with
perceived likelihood and severity, worry, and protection and detection motiva-
tions. In terms of abstract–conceptual contents, the study tests the hypotheses
that: (a) Identity, cause, and timeline risk beliefs will be positively associated with
likelihood perceptions; (b) Greater consequences beliefs and lower control
risk beliefs will be associated with greater severity perceptions; (c) All
representational beliefs will be associated with worry; and (d) Representational
beliefs will be directly associated with intentions when likelihood, severity, and
worry are controlled. In terms of imagery contents, it is predicted that:
(a) Positive and vivid imagery will be associated with greater prevention
intentions and actions; and (b) Skin symptom imagery will moderate the
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relationship between worry and protection motivation, with worry more strongly
associated with motivation when symptom imagery is present than when it is not.
Method
Participants and procedure
Participants (N¼120) were recruited from classes at the University of Auckland
during either the first week (N¼94) or the last two weeks (N¼36) of the
academic year, when warm weather and high UV levels were expected over
the upcoming month. The sample consisted of 75 women and 45 men (age
range¼18–53 years, M¼25.84), none of whom had ever been diagnosed with
skin cancer. Participants identified their ethnicity as New Zealand European
(76%), Asian (10%), Maori or Pacific Island (9%), or other (6%).
Participants completed a survey with the AIRR for skin cancer and measures
of likelihood, severity, worry and intentions for detection and prevention
behaviors. Those recruited at the beginning of the year received a second
survey during classes held four weeks later. This survey included measures
of detection and prevention behavior, and the AIRR subscales warranting
assessments of test–retest reliability. Of these 94 participants, 79 (84%)
completed the follow-up survey. Participants recruited at the end of the year
did not receive the second survey because classes were no longer in session. They
did not differ from the other participants on any of the AIRR, perceived risk,
worry, or intention variables.
Assessment of illness risk representations (AIRR)
The AIRR begins with an imagery subscale, followed by subscales assessing
the abstract contents of the risk representations. Many items of the abstract
belief subscales (Appendix) were adapted from items used in the IPQ-R. Subscale
score ranges, internal consistencies, and test–retest reliabilities are presented
in Table I.
Imagery. The imagery subscale begins with the following instructions:
‘‘We are interested in understanding some of the images that immediately enter your mind
when you think about a specific topic. In order to investigate this, we would like you to list five
images that you immediately associate with a particular topic. These may be single words, or
small phrases. It is important that you do this quickly—do not spend too much time thinking
over your answers. Remember that it is your immediate impressions that we are interested in.
Think for a moment about: Skin Cancer. What are the first five images that come to your mind
when you think about this condition? Please list these images below.’’
Five numbered lines are provided, after which are the instructions:
‘‘Now we want to be sure we understand if these images mean something positive or negative
to you. Please rate your images in the order in which you gave them on the scales below.’’
Each image is then rated on a scale with response options of very negative/very
bad, somewhat negative, neutral, somewhat positive and very positive/very good.
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These response options were later coded as  2,  1, 0, 1, and 2, respectively.
The final section read,
‘‘Now we would like you to rate how vivid your images were overall. Please circle a number
for each image using the following scale, ranging from ‘‘no image at all (you only ‘‘know’’ that
you are thinking of something)’’ to ‘‘perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.’’
Each image is rated on a scale with response options of no image at all (1), vague
and dim (2), somewhat vivid (3), reasonably vivid (4), and perfectly clear and
vivid (5). Responses are used to generate three sets of imagery scores: content,
positivity, and vividness. For imagery content, each image is categorized into one
of the categories listed in Table II. For each content category, respondents are
coded as ‘‘1’’ if one of the five images falls into that category and as ‘‘0’’ if none
of the images fall into that category. Inter-rater reliability was high; Cohen’s
Kappa¼0.92. Positivity is calculated as the average positivity rating for the five
images and vividness is calculated as the average vividness rating for the images.
Identity risk beliefs. The identity risk subscale yields scores reflecting the
combination of beliefs about having certain characteristics or symptoms
(Appendix) and beliefs about the risk potential of these features. Responses of
whether one has a feature are coded as 1 (yes) and 0 (no). Each feature is then
rated from 0 (definitely not)t o4( definitely) in response to ‘‘Do you think that this
characteristic puts a person at risk for skin cancer?’’ (features 1–8) or ‘‘Do you
think that this symptom or feature may be a sign of skin cancer?’’ (features 9–23).
Scores are generated by calculating the product of the two ratings for
each feature, and then summing the products: Identity risk¼ [Feature: 0
or 1] [Risk potential of feature: 0 to 4].
Causal risk beliefs. The causal risk subscale yields scores reflecting the
combination of beliefs about experiences that cause skin cancer and beliefs
about one’s history of those experiences. The subscale uses the standard IPQ-R
instructions and response format to assess agreement that the items (Appendix)
are potential causes of skin cancer. The responses are coded as follows: strongly
disagree (0), disagree (0), neither agree nor disagree (1), agree (2), strongly agree (3).
The starred items are used to generate causal risk scores. The personal history
items are coded as indicated in the Appendix. Causal risk scores are generated by
calculating the product of the cause rating and the personal history for each of
four causes: heredity, bad sunburns, minor sunburns and sun exposure without
sunscreen. These four products are then summed: Causal risk¼ [Cause
rating Personal history].
Timeline risk beliefs. The 3-item subscale assessing timeline risk beliefs
is presented in the Appendix. The item ratings are averaged to generate scores.
Control risk beliefs. Three subscales assess control beliefs about illness risk:
personal control over prevention, personal control over cure, and
treatment control (Appendix). Ratings are averaged after reverse-scoring
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the negatively-phrased items. A principal components analysis (with varimax
rotation) of all control risk items yielded three factors, with each item loading
most highly (>|0.55|) onto the factor reflecting its respective subscale.
Consequences risk beliefs. Three subscales assess consequences risk beliefs about
pain, shortened life, and psychosocial effects. For each subscale, the item ratings
are averaged after reverse-scoring negatively phrased items. A principal
components analysis (with varimax rotation) of all consequences risk items
yielded three factors representing the subscales. Items loaded most highly (with
loadings>|0.50|) onto the expected factors, with the exception of the item,
‘‘...it would cause difficulties for those who are close to me’’, for which loadings
ranged from 0.25 to 0.41 across the factors. This psychosocial effects item was
retained because of its conceptual relevance and importance, and because its
inclusion increased the subscale’s  whereas, for each of the other two subscales,
its inclusion decreased the .
Additional measures
Perceived likelihood, perceived severity, and worry. Items used in prior research
(Cameron & Reeve, 2006; Weinstein, 2000) were adapted to relate to skin
cancer: ‘‘How likely do you think it is that you will develop skin cancer at any time
in the future?’’, rated from no chance (0) to certain to happen (10); and ‘‘How
vulnerable do you think you are to getting skin cancer at some point in your life?’’,
rated from not at all (0) to extremely (10). The ratings were averaged; ¼0.80.
Likelihood scores were moderately stable over the 4 week assessment period;
r¼0.55. A 1-item severity measure (Weinstein, 2000) was used: ‘‘How serious do
you think it would be if you were to develop skin cancer?’’ Ratings ranged from 0
(innocuous, no harm at all)t o1 0( extremely devastating); test–retest reliability
r¼0.46. Worry was assessed with three items (Cameron & Reeve, 2006; McCaul,
Mullens, Romanek, Erickson, & Gatheridge, in press): (1) To what extent are you
worried about skin cancer?; (2) How much does thinking about skin cancer
bother you?; and (3) To what extent are you concerned about getting skin cancer?
Ratings of 0 (not at all)t o1 0( extremely) were averaged; ¼0.87, test–retest
reliability r¼0.66.
Detection and prevention intentions and behavior. A 3-item intention measure
(Ajzen, 2002) was adapted to assess intentions for skin self-examination (SSE;
e.g., ‘‘In the next month, to what extent do you plan to carry out a skin
self-examination? ‘‘) and clinical skin examination (CSE; e.g., ‘‘In the next
month, how likely is it that you will go for a clinical examination by a doctor or
other health professional?’’). Ratings ranged from 1 (not at all/extremely unlikely)
to 5 (definitely/extremely likely) and were averaged. For both measures, ¼0.94.
The Sun Protective Behaviors Index (SPBI; Cokkindides et al., 2001)
was adapted to assess prevention intentions. The items were preceded with
the stem, ‘‘In the next month, when you are going outside on a sunny day
for more than 15min, how often do you plan to...’’ The items were: (1) stay in
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the shade; (2) wear a hat; (3) wear a long sleeved shirt and long skirt, shorts or
trousers; and (4) apply sunscreen regularly. Ratings ranged from 1 (never)t o5
(always), and were averaged; ¼0.58.
To assess detection behaviors, participants were asked, ‘‘In the last 4 weeks,
did you... (1) carry out a skin self-examination (yes or no); and (2) go for a
clinical skin examination by a doctor or other health professional (yes or no).
Prevention behaviors were assessed with an adapted version of the SPBI
consisting of four items preceded by the stem, ‘‘In the last 4 weeks, when
you were outside on a sunny day for more than 15min, how often did you...’’
The items were: (1) stay in the shade; (2) wear a hat; (3) wear a long sleeved
shirt and long skirt, shorts, or trousers; and (4) apply sunscreen regularly. Ratings
ranged from 1 (never)t o5( always) and were averaged.
Results
Analyses of the normality of distributions revealed positive skewness in CSE
intentions, and preliminary assessments revealed slight differences in the patterns
of findings of analyses using original scores versus logarithmic transformations
of scores. The latter were therefore used in the final analyses. No other variables
exhibited problematic skewness.
Descriptive assessments of risk representation contents
Prior to generating identity risk and causal risk scores, the mean risk ratings of
items were calculated to identify those most and least associated with skin cancer
risk. Identity features rated as creating the most risk were skin that sunburns
easily (M¼3.37), pale skin (M¼3.00), mole with irregular borders (M¼2.89),
skin with 20 or moles (M¼2.85), blue–black mole (M¼2.67) and mole with
two colors (M¼2.66). Features seen as least risky were light-colored eyes
(M¼1.00), sleep difficulties (M¼1.08), breathlessness (M¼1.13), loss of
strength (M¼1.34) and light hair (M¼1.37). Causal factors receiving the
highest risk ratings were sun exposure without using sunscreen (M¼2.50), bad
(blistering) sunburns (M¼1.77), pollution or hazards in the environment
(M¼1.61), and many minor sunburns (M¼1.51). Causal factors receiving
neutral ratings on average included aging (M¼1.35), poor immune function
(M¼1.32), heredity (M¼1.13), and exposure while using sunscreen (M¼1.12).
All other factors had mean ratings less than 1.0.
Table I presents the means, SDs, and correlations of the risk representation
subscales. Consequences and control risk beliefs tended to be neutral, although
beliefs of personal control over prevention were generally high. Imagery vividness
and valence scores also had reasonable variance, and the central tendency was
towards negative imagery. Test–retest reliabilities were lower for imagery
vividness and valence than for the other risk representation subscales, suggesting
that imagery contents are more variable over time. Correlation analyses revealed
meaningful patterns of associations among the risk representation subscales.
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Causal risk beliefs were associated with greater identity and timeline risk beliefs.
Timeline risk beliefs were positively associated with beliefs of personal control
over prevention. There were significant correlations among the three sets of
personal control beliefs, as well as among the three sets of consequences risk
beliefs. The subscales exhibited reasonable discriminant validity, with no
correlations over r¼0.54.
Imagery contents
Overall, 115 (95%) of the 120 respondents reported five images; only one
participant failed to report at least one image. As shown in Table II, the types of
images reported by the greatest proportion of participants related to identity
(skin symptoms, moles, melanoma and pale skin) and cause (sun exposure and
sunburns). Many participants reported imagery relating to control (prevention
behavior and medical treatment), and consequences (death, disfigurement, and
pain). Fewer participants reported imagery associated with timeline (e.g., aging)
or detection procedures. Just over 40% of the participants reported at least one
image that did not fall into the 14 content categories; these images represented
only 13% of the total images reported. In sum, concrete representations of skin
cancer included some idiosyncratic types of images, but most images fell into
common categories.
Point–biserial correlations revealed several weak but meaningful associations
between concrete and conceptual contents of risk representations. Mole imagery
was associated with stronger identity risk beliefs (r¼0.19, P<0.05) and death
imagery was associated with stronger beliefs of shortened life consequences
(r¼0.23, P<0.01). Disfigurement imagery correlated with lower beliefs of
treatment control (r¼ 0.19, P<0.05) and aging imagery correlated with
timeline risk beliefs that skin cancer was unlikely to occur at one’s age
(r¼0.18, P<0.05). Skin symptom imagery correlated with beliefs of greater
control over cure (r¼0.24, P<0.05).
Predictors of risk appraisals and worry
Correlation and multiple regression analyses assessed the zero-order and
independent relationships of risk representation variables with likelihood,
severity, and worry. For the regression analyses, the predictors included variables
that correlated with the dependent measure at a significance level of P<0.10.
Variables that were not significant predictors in the initial regression were
removed. Table III presents the results for the final regression models.
As predicted, the attributes of identity, cause, and timeline were positively
associated with greater perceived likelihood. Unexpectedly, beliefs of greater
personal control over cure were associated with lower likelihood perceptions.
When these four variables were entered into a regression analysis, all but causal
risk beliefs independently predicted likelihood perceptions. A supplementary
regression analysis confirmed that causal risk did not uniquely predict likelihood
appraisals due to its moderate correlation with identity risk: when identity risk
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was omitted from the set of independent variables, causal risk was independently
associated with higher likelihood appraisals; ¼0.30, t¼3.47, P<0.001.
For perceived severity, all three consequences beliefs were correlated with
greater severity as predicted. Contrary to predictions, control risk beliefs were
not associated with perceived severity. Unexpectedly, timeline beliefs that skin
cancer is likely to affect a person of one’s age were associated with
greater severity perceptions. Regression analysis revealed that shortened life
consequences, pain consequences, and timeline risk beliefs accounted for unique
variance in perceived severity. Worry was positively correlated with identity risk,
causal risk, timeline risk, and pain consequences beliefs. Regression analysis
revealed that identity and timeline risk beliefs accounted for unique variance
in worry.
Predictors of detection and prevention intentions
Table IV presents the results of correlation and multiple regression analyses
(final models) assessing correlates and independent predictors of intentions.
For the regression analyses, the predictor variables included: (a) variables
correlating with the dependent measure at a significance level of P<0.10; and
(b) a set of variables to assess the worry symptom image interactions,
with worry scores centered about the mean. Variables that were not significant
predictors in the initial regression were removed, except worry and symptom
image were retained when the worry symptom image interaction was
significant.
For SSE intentions, the risk representation factors of identity, cause and
timeline risk were associated with higher intentions. In addition, perceived
Table III. Correlation and multiple regression analyses of relationships of risk representation
attributes with risk appraisals and worry.
r  Model F/total R
2 Mean (SD)
Likelihood 14.22**/0.28 4.85 (0.84)
Identity risk 0.41** 0.38**
Causal risk 0.39** –
Timeline risk 0.27** 0.26**
Personal control-cure  0.23*  0.19*
Severity 13.72**/0.26 6.68 (1.67)
Pain consequences 0.40** 0.29**
Shortened life consequences 0.40** 0.24**
Psychosocial consequences 0.33** –
Timeline risk 0.31** 0.19*
Worry 22.10**/0.28 4.11 (2.10)
Identity risk 0.43** 0.43**
Causal risk 0.32** –
Timeline risk 0.31** 0.28**
Pain consequences 0.20* –
Note: *P<0.05; **P<0.01.
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likelihood and worry were correlated as expected with higher intentions;
perceived severity was unrelated to these intentions. Multiple regression analysis
revealed that perceived likelihood did not independently predict SSE intentions,
when worry and the risk representation beliefs were controlled. Instead, SSE
intentions were independently predicted by higher identity risk beliefs and the
interactive effects of worry and skin symptom imagery (Figure 1). For individuals
reporting symptom images, increments in worry were associated with higher
SSE intentions. For individuals without symptom images, intentions were low
regardless of the worry levels. Analyses of the correlations between worry and
intentions for the two symptom imagery groups confirmed the correlation was
significant for participants with a symptom image (r¼0.44, P<0.01) but not
for participants with no symptom image (r¼ 0.03, ns).
CSE intentions were positively associated with two risk representation beliefs,
identity and timeline risk, and with perceived likelihood, perceived severity
and worry. Regression analysis revealed that timeline risk was independently
associated with intentions whereas likelihood, severity, worry and identity risk
Table IV. Correlation and multiple regression analyses of relationships of risk representation
attributes with protection intentions and behavior.
r  Model F/total R
2 Mean (SD)
Skin self-exam intentions 5.25**/0.15 2.49 (1.30)
Identity risk 0.25** 0.20*
Causal risk 0.18* –
Timeline risk 0.18* –
Likelihood 0.21* –
Worry 0.23*  0.06
Skin symptom image 0.12 0.15
Worry skin symptom image – 0.32**
Clinical skin exam intentions 11.26**/0.28 1.77 (1.13)
Identity risk 0.20* –
Timeline risk 0.36** 0.25**
Likelihood 0.24** –
Severity 0.22** –
Worry 0.35**  0.06
Skin symptom image 0.12 0.18*
Worry skin symptom image – 0.34**
Prevention intentions 5.65**/0.23 3.08 (0.70)
Personal control-cure 0.19* 0.22*
Imagery vividness 0.30** 0.23**
Imagery positivity 0.14þ 0.18*
Worry 0.17þ  0.08
Skin symptom image 0.13 0.13
Worry skin symptom image – 0.32**
Prevention behaviors 16.32**/0.31 2.67 (0.70)
Prevention intentions 0.51** 0.52**
Treatment control-cure  0.21*  0.21*
Imagery vividness 0.29** –
Note: þP<0.10; *P<0.05, **P<0.01.
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were not. A worry symptom image interaction effect mirrored that observed
for SSE intentions (Figure 1). As predicted, individuals with a symptom image
reported greater intentions when worry was also high, whereas individuals with
no symptom image reported low intentions regardless of worry levels.
For participants with a symptom image, the correlation between worry and
intentions was r¼0.59 (P<0.01); for participants with no symptom image, the
correlation was r¼0.09 (ns).
The risk representation variables associated with (greater) prevention inten-
tions were beliefs of high control over cure and greater imagery vividness.
There were trends for positive associations of imagery positivity and
worry with intentions. These intentions were not associated with perceived
likelihood or severity. Regression analysis revealed that personal control over cure
beliefs, imagery vividness, and imagery positivity accounted for unique
variance in intentions. As with SSE and CSE intentions, a worry symptom
image interaction revealed that individuals with symptom images reported
higher intentions, when worry was also high whereas individuals with
no symptom images reported low intentions regardless of worry levels.
The correlations between worry and intentions were r¼0.41 (P<0.01) for
participants who reported symptom imagery and r¼0.03 (ns) for those who
did not.
Additional analyses evaluated each of the other top eight image categories
in terms of their main effects and imagery worry interaction effects on SSE,
CSE, and prevention intentions; none were significant. Moreover, assessments
of symptom imagery likelihood interaction effects on intentions revealed that
the interaction effects were not significant. The interaction effects appear to be
specific to the factors of symptom imagery and worry.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Low
(a) Skin self-exam
intentions
Worry
Symptom image
No symptom image
(b) Clinical skin exam
intentions
Worry
(c) Prevention intentions
Worry
High
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Low High
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Low High
Figure 1. Worry skin symptom image interaction effects on (a) skin self-examination intentions;
(b) clinical skin exam intentions; and (c) prevention intentions. The values were estimated
by setting the high and low worry scores in the regression equation to one SD above and below
the mean, respectively.
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Detection and prevention behaviors
Of the 79 participants who completed the follow-up survey 4 weeks later, only
11 (14%) reported having conducted a skin self-exam and only three (4%)
reported having obtained a clinical exam. These proportions were too low to
permit analyses to identify potential predictors. For prevention behavior
(Table IV), correlational analyses revealed that use of sun protection was
associated with greater intentions, beliefs of poor disease control through
treatment and greater imagery vividness. Regression analysis revealed that only
intentions and treatment control independently predicted sun protection
behavior.
Discussion
This study provides descriptive information regarding the contents of risk
representations for skin cancer held by a sample of adults. It identified physical
features (e.g., moles with irregular borders) and causes (e.g., sun exposure
without use of sunscreen) that were readily identified as risk factors, as well as
those less likely to be regarded as risk factors (e.g., heredity). In addition, the
use of an imagery measure yielded insights about the nature of imagery contents
of risk representations. The majority of skin cancer images reported by
participants fell into categories relating to representational attributes identified
by the CSM: identity, cause, control, and consequences. Symptom imagery was
highly prevalent, with 45% of the sample reporting at least one symptom image.
The other types of images most commonly reported by respondents related to sun
exposure, moles, and treatment procedures.
A primary goal was to identify how contents of risk representations are
associated with likelihood and severity appraisals and worry. As predicted,
likelihood appraisals were positively associated with beliefs about causal risk,
identity risk, and timeline risk. Both identity risk and timeline risk accounted
for unique variance in likelihood appraisals; causal risk did not uniquely predict
likelihood appraisals due to its moderate correlation with identity risk. Beliefs
of low personal control over cure were also associated with greater likelihood
appraisals. This relationship could reflect an influence of disease threat on
perceived vulnerability: Beliefs that one would not be able to cure the disease may
fuel appraisals that one is vulnerable to it and this sense of vulnerability may,
via nonreasoned processes, transfer to appraisals of vulnerability to developing the
illness. Alternatively, the two cognitions may be linked by way of a third variable,
such as dispositional pessimism or anxiety (Gerend, Aiken, & West, 2004;
McGregor et al., 2004).
As predicted, severity appraisals were associated with beliefs about pain,
shortened life, and psychosocial consequences. Severity appraisals were also
associated with timeline risk beliefs, with those believing that skin cancer could
occur at one’s age appraising the disease as more severe. It is possible that
age relevance of skin cancer may enhance appraisals of its seriousness.
Illness risk representations and skin cancer risk 105D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
S
w
e
t
s
 
C
o
n
t
e
n
t
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
2
:
3
3
 
8
 
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
8
 
Because it might occur in the near future, individuals may be motivated to process
information about it and thus develop more detailed representations of its
potential consequences (Cameron, 2003a; Kreuter, Bull, Clark, & Oswald,
1999).
Worry was associated with the risk attributes of identity, cause, timeline, and
pain consequences, although only identity and timeline risk accounted for unique
variance in worry. These correlational findings suggest the utility of health
communications research to assess whether worry is enhanced by information
about identity risk, such as information about physical features that increase
susceptibility, and timeline risk, such as information that skin cancer can occur
in people of a comparable age. On the other hand, the findings suggest that
information about psychosocial consequences, mortality rates, or disease control
may have little influence on skin cancer worry. Media appeals that focus on
providing information about these aspects of skin cancer may fail to increase
worry over the longer term.
Identity, cause, and timeline risk were associated with one or both of the
detection intentions. Identity risk independently predicted SSE intentions,
whereas timeline risk independently predicted CSE intentions. Although
likelihood and severity appraisals were also correlated with detection intentions,
their associations were not significant when entered simultaneously with the risk
representational attributes. Similarly, likelihood and severity appraisals did
not independently predict prevention intentions. These findings suggest that
the risk representation attributes are directly linked with intentions and that
they, rather than likelihood and severity appraisals, are cognitions upon which
protection intentions are based.
Prevention intentions were associated with beliefs about personal control over
cure and with imagery contents. As predicted, vivid and positive imagery was
associated with greater intentions; vivid imagery was also positively associated
with subsequent prevention behavior, although it was not a significant predictor
after controlling for prevention intentions. Vivid imagery is likely to enhance the
salience and accessibility of skin cancer risk, thereby increasing motivations
for prevention behavior when exposed to sunny conditions (Stacy et al., 2004a).
The association of positive imagery with prevention intentions is consistent with
the thesis that positive imagery is linked with approach motivation processes
that enhance attentional focus on skin cancer prevention. These findings
complement prior research indicating that positive cues elicit approach
tendencies that can, in turn, promote prevention behaviors (Chen & Bargh,
1999; Rothman et al., 2003).
As predicted, skin symptom imagery interacted with worry to predict both
prevention and detection intentions. For participants reporting a symptom image,
worry was associated with greater intentions; for those who did not report
a symptom image, worry was unrelated to intentions. These findings suggest
one way in which imagery processes interact with affective processes to influence
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protection motivation. In particular, mental images of illness symptoms may
activate considerations of protective actions, with intentions being influenced by
affective processes in which worry serves as an affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). With a symptom image prompting illness concern,
worry may be interpreted as a gut-level indicant of one’s vulnerability and need
for protection. Research is needed to investigate whether interventions that
enhance both accessibility of symptom images and worry will increase
motivations for protective action.
The associations of imagery attributes with protection intentions and behavior
suggest the potential utility of intervention efforts that instill vivid and positive
images as well as images of disease symptoms. These findings complement
research on the persuasiveness of health messages containing graphic images.
For example, skin cancer messages containing vivid imagery were found to be
more persuasive than messages with nonvivid material, although this effect held
only when recipients had high self-efficacy for the protection behaviors (Block &
Keller, 1997). Similarly, graphic images of cancer symptoms on cigarette labels
increase negative reactions and quit attempts among smokers (Hammond, Fong,
McDonald, Brown, & Cameron, 2003). As noted by Green (2006), imagery
may be most powerful when presented within a coherent narrative structure
such as a story. Such messages are likely to foster coherent risk representations
in which images are meaningfully linked with cognitions and protection
motivations.
Prevention control beliefs did not correlate with prevention intentions
or behavior. Participants generally reported high prevention control and so
there may not have been sufficient variance to detect associations with prevention
intentions and behavior. Further research may find that this measure is useful
in predicting protection intentions and behaviors for illnesses where there is less
agreement on personal control over prevention.
Prevention intentions were the primary predictor of subsequent prevention
behavior, although beliefs about treatment control independently predicted
(lower) prevention behavior as well. It may be that, when faced with the
temptation to be in the sun without protection, individuals with high treatment
control beliefs may discount the health risk by rationalizing that skin cancer
can be treated effectively. Despite their intentions, they may succumb to the
temptation on the basis of this rationalization. Replication of this relationship is
needed.
The findings provide new evidence regarding representations of skin cancer
risk, although several constraints must be noted. The sample consisted of adults
attending a university in New Zealand, and so the findings may not generalize
to populations with different educational and cultural backgrounds. The study
materials focused on skin cancer in general rather than melanoma or another
form of skin cancer, because pilot research with this population revealed high
awareness of skin cancer in general but low awareness of melanoma (Ong, 2001).
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This difference in awareness is consistent with the focus on skin cancer (and not
melanoma) by New Zealand’s sun protection campaigns. For people who are
cognizant of the different types of skin cancer, their representations for melanoma
may differ from their representations for other skin cancers primarily in terms
of consequences beliefs: They are likely to have stronger consequences beliefs
for melanoma than for basal and squamous cell carcinomas. For these people,
the patterns of relationships involving consequences beliefs may vary from
those observed in this study. The use of SSE and CSE was low, reflecting the
low rates in the absence of interventions aimed at promoting these behaviors.
Future studies will require the use of SSE and CSE promotion materials in
order to assess the relationships of risk representations with these detection
behaviors. Finally, the imagery measure utilizes verbal instructions and verbal
reports of mental images and so it provides a limited understanding of the
nature of the concrete images within the risk representation. Techniques such as
drawing mental images (Stacy et al., 2004b) or selecting images that are similar
to one’s mental images, may provide supplementary assessments of imagery
contents.
To conclude, the findings suggest ways in which the contents of risk
representations may serve as the basis for appraisals of likelihood and severity,
worry, and motivations for protective behavior. The results also support the
utility of the AIRR as a technique for assessing risk representations. The subscales
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency and stability over time, and
their intercorrelations revealed meaningful patterns as well as relative indepen-
dence. The imagery subscale opens up opportunities to systematically explore
imagery associated with illness risks. Use of the AIRR can lead to a richer
understanding of illness risk representations and their influence on protective
behaviors.
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Appendix
Identity
1. White or pale skin
2. Light-colored eyes: blue, green,
grey, or hazel
3. Skin with 20 or more moles
4. Skin with 5–19 moles
5. Naturally light-colored hair
6. Skin doesn’t tan easily
7. Skin tends to freckle
8. Skin sunburns easily
9. Loss of strength
10. Unusual lump under skin
11. Dark blue or black mole
12. Mole with irregular borders
13. Unusual sweating
14. Mole with two or more colors
15. Fatigue
16. Unusual skin blemish
17. Breathlessness
18. Mole larger than diameter of a
pencil
19. Fever
20. Sleep difficulties
21. Nausea
22. Painful area on the skin
23. Sudden change in weight
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Have any family members had skin cancer?* Yes____ No____
Values: 10 0
How many times in your life have you had a bad (blistering) sun burn?*
None 1 or 2 3 or more
Values: 0 5 10
How many sunburns have you had in your life?*
0 1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20 21 or more
Values: 0 2 4 6 8 10
Over your life, how much time have you spent in the sun without sunscreen?*
0134567891 0
None at all A great deal
Values: As given
Timeline risk
People of my age are likely to develop skin cancer at this time in their lives.
01234567891 0
Strongly disagree Neither agree Strongly agree
nor disagree
Causal risk (items with a * are used to generate causal risk scores)
1. Skin cancer is hereditary – it runs
in the family
1*
2. Diet or eating habits
1
3. Pollution or hazards in the
environment
1
4. Poor immune function
5. Stress or worry
1
6. Having one or more bad (blis-
tering) sunburns during one’s
lifetime*
7. Having many minor sunburns
during one’s lifetime*
8. Chance or bad luck
1
9. Poor medical care in the past
1
10. Accident or injury
1
11. A germ or virus
1
12. Lots of sun exposure to skin with-
out using sunscreen*
13. Lots of sun exposure to skin while
using sunscreen
14. Mental attitude – thinking about
life negatively
1
15. Lack of exercise
1
16. Overwork
1
17. Aging
1
18. Emotional state – feeling down,
anxious, lonely, empty
1
19. Smoking tobacco
1
20. Alcohol use
1
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How likely is it that a person your age would get skin cancer now – at this age:
01234567891 0
No chance Probably 50–50 Probably Certain
will not chance will happen to happen
happen
How likely is it that a person of your age would get skin cancer in the next 10 years:
01234567891 0
No chance Probably 50–50 Probably Certain
will not chance will happen to happen
happen
Consequences risk (PS¼psychosocial; P¼pain; SL¼shortened life)
If I had skin cancer, it would cause difficulties for those who are close to me.
1 PS
Skin cancer is a painful condition. P
Having skin cancer would have no effect on how long I live. SL
If I had skin cancer, I would not be able to participate in some work activities. PS
If I had skin cancer, I would have to undergo painful treatments. P
Having skin cancer would affect the way others see me.
1 PS
Having skin cancer would shorten my life. SL
If I had skin cancer, I would not be able to participate in some social or leisure
activities. PS
If I get skin cancer, I will die fairly quickly. SL
Skin cancer would have serious financial consequences for me.
1 PS
Personal control over prevention
There is a lot that I can do to prevent skin cancer.
1
What I do will determine whether or not I get skin cancer.
1
My actions will have no effect on whether or not I get skin cancer.
1
Personal control over cure
If I get skin cancer, there is a lot I can do to control or cure it.
1
If I get skin cancer, my actions will have no effect on whether it gets better or
worse.
1
If I get skin cancer, the course of the illness will depend on me.
1
Treatment control
There is little that can be done to treat skin cancer.
1
If I get skin cancer, then it can be controlled or cured through medical treatment.
1
If I get skin cancer, the negative effects of the illness could be controlled or
avoided by medical treatments.
1
1 Item adapted from the Illness Perception Questionnaire-Revised (IPQ-R).
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